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ALFRED W.

v. SELMA P. E.

Animals-Liability for Injuries by Dogs-Defenses.-In
the owner of a
liable
tion of risk
available in all proper cases.
[2] Negligence--Assumption of Risk-Elements.-The elements of
the defense of
of risk are a
and
involved and his voluntary accept[3] Animals-Liability for Injuries by Dogs-Assumption of Risk.
- I f a salesman outside a fence with a closed gate recognized
the danger that a barking dog inside the fence would bite him
if he entered, his knowledge was sufficient to assume the risk
of being bitten should he expose himself to the danger, although he did not know whether the
had a history of
viciousness.

[4] Negligence-Assumption of Risk-Knowledge of Danger.Assuming that the defense of assumption of risk is not available unhlss plaintiff had actual knowledge, as distinguished
from constructive notice, of the risk, actual lmov;ledge of the
risk may be inferred from the circumstances.
[5] Animals-Liability for Injuries by Dogs-Evidence.-In an
action under the Dog Bite Statute
§ 3342) for injuries sustained by a salesman w}wn bitten
defendant's dog,
a finding that plaintiff assumed the risk of being bitten was
sustained by evidence
the
display
of
inside a wire
plaintiff
elected to leave his
sidewalk
outside the fence and
on defendant's enclosed property, since in so
himself to the
obvious hazard.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d,
§ 57 et seq.; Am.Jur., Animals,
§§56., 58.
See Cal.Jur.2d,
§ 216; Am.Jur.,
et seq,
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 5] Animals, §57; [2, 4] Negligence,
§ 32.
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Court of Butte
G.
from order

dismissed.
for
for defendant affirmed.
&

from a

Barceloux
and Jordan l.VI. Peckham
D. :M:cKalson

,J.-Plaintiff
under the so-called
Dog Bite Statute ( Civ. Code, § 3342) for injuries inflicted by
defendant's
Pollowing a trial without a ;jury, judgment
was entered for defendant. Plaintiff appeals from said judgment and from the order denying his motion for a new trial.
'l'he latter order is not appealable and therefore the purported
therefrom must be dismissed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963.)
Defendant is a praetieal nurse and uses her premises as a
private nursing home. At the time of the occurrence, the house
and yard were surrounded by a wire fence with a closed gate.
A
led from the gate to the front door. No signs were
or solicitors
on the premises indicating that
were unwelcome, nor was there any sign
of a vicious
a salesman for the Fuller Brush Company, was
canvassing in the neighborhood of defendant's home. As he
walked along the sidewalk approaching the gate leading to
defendant's door, the dog in the enclosed
followed him
along the inside of the fence for about 50 feet, barking continuously all the way. Plaintiff nevertheless
the gate
and walked into the
the dog bit him on the
right lower
a puncture wound and superficial
abrasions.
heard the
went to
the door and met
as he came up the
Plaintiff
said that
had bitten him; defendant expressed her
sorrow at the
; and plaintiff responded with the statement that it was one of "the hazards of the game." Plaintiff
gave defendant a
and left. rrhe next day plaintiff
again called at defendant's home and at that time defendant
bought some merchandise from him.
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Section 3342 of the Civil Code
: ''The owner of any
is liable for the
suffered
any person who is
while iu a public place or lawfully in a prithe property of the owner of the dog,
of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's
such viciousness. A person is lawfully upon the
property of such owner within the
of this
section when he is on
. . . upon the invitation,
of the owner.''
express or
The trial court denial of recovery was based upon findings
that (1)
was not a business visitor or invitee on the
that plaintiff was negligent in entering defendant's
and
) that plaintiff assumed the risk. Since
we have concluded that the record sustains the finding that
plaintiff assumed the risk, it is unnecessary to consider his
contention that he was lawfully on the premises or his further
contention that contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery under the Dog Bite Statute.
[1] In adopting section 3342 of the Civil Code, the Legislature did not intend to render inapplicable such defenses as
assumption of risk or wilfully invited injury. Therefore those
defenses are available in all proper cases. (See Smythe v.
Schacht, 93 Cal.App.2d 315, 321 [209 P.2d 114] ; see also 2
Harper and James, The Law of Torts (1956) § 14.12, pp.
843-845.)
Plaintiff contends that the defense of assumption of risk
is not available here because there was no showing that the
dog had a history of viciousness or that plaintiff knew of
that history. He argues that the knowledge required of a
plaintiff before he can be held to have assumed the risk is
identical to that which had been required to impose liability
on the owner of the dog prior to the enactment of section 3342
of the Civil Code. We have concluded that plaintiff's position
cannot be sustained.
[2] The ''elements of the defense of assumption of risk
arc a person's knowledge and appreciation of the danger involved and his voluntary acceptance of the risk." (Prescott
v. Ralphs
Co., 42 Ca1.2d 158, 162 [265 P.2d 904] ;
emphasis added.)
[3] Thus if plaintiff recognized the
danger that the dog would bite him, his knowledge was sufficient
he did not know whether the dog had a history
of viciousness.
[4] Plaintiff claims, however, that there was no showing

Jan.
that
had aetua l
as:mmcd for ihe purpose of tlli;; f1iscusRion that the defense
of assumption of risk is not available unless the
intiff had
actual
as
from construeiivP
of thr ri"k
wpm, 42
Cal.2d 1
]62; Slobodcn Y.
557, 562 [281 P.2d
] ; :);-) CaL.Jm
§ 277, p.
828; Comment, 10 So. Cal. h Hev. 67. 74.) Bnt actual knowledge of the rjE!k mav be inferred from the eireumstanees.
(Chino Yee v. Dy
148
138-130 [299
P.2d 668] .)
[5] Here the dog had follmYcd plaintiff
for 50 feet'
all the way. r nder these
the risk was obvious. Notwithstand
the dog's display of
hostility, plaintiff P]rded to leave his
of
upon
the ]mblir: sidewalk and to enter npon defemlant 's en dosed
private property. In so ooing, he voluntarily
himself
to the obvious hazard. It was a caleulated risk on plaintiff's
part, or, as he expressed it, one of the "hazards of the game."
We therefore eon elude that the trial court's finding that plaintiff assumed that risk is amply supported by the evidence.
The purported appeal from the order denying a new trial
is dismissed, and the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., eoncurred.
CAHTER, J.-T dissent.
I find nothing in the reeord to support the trial court's
finding that the plaintiff assumed the risk. As the majority
eorreetly points out, one of the clements of tl1e defense of
assumption of risk is knowledge of the danger ill volvcd. This
clement is dearly absent in this case.
The majority has held that "the risk was obvious." The
sole predicate for its position is that "the dog had followed
plaintiff along the fenee for 50 feet, barking all the way."
To hold that this single piece of evidence is sufficient to show
that the plaintiff had knowledge of the
is umcalistie
and erroneous.
One does not have to be an expert on dogs to know that a
dog that barks is not neeessarily vieious or dangerous. vVhen
a dog barks and runs alongside of a passer-by, more often than
not it is only being playful and seeking attention. Aetion of
this sort by a dog, barring other eircumstances, is not a sufficient basis from whieh to draw an inference that the passer-by

lS

not sufficient.
The
in
defendant's
erroneous.
'l'hc record is devoid of evidence
that the plaintiff
was negligent in any 1vay. IImYever, even if there was such
evidence, it appears that
not a defense io liability nnder Civil
section 8342.
93
813, 322 [209 P.2d 114].)
HL""'";.; that the trial ioOurt made a basis for denial
of recovery was that the plaintiff was not a business visitor or
invitee on the
'l'his also appears to he incorrect.
Salesmen are considered invitees when
come to a place
which
have good reason to believe is open for possible
dealings vdth them.
Law of Torts, p. 457.) In this
case the plaintiff was
which he could reasonably believe ~would be useful
and in which
she would he interested. J\Ioreove1·, defendant had not posted
signs
that peddlers and salesmen were unwdcome.
In light of these
the
was justified in believing
that defendant's
were open to him. ''Every man,
by implication invites others to come to his house as they may
have proper oceasion either of business or
or information, etc." (Duval v. Rowell, 124 Cal.App.2d Snpp. 897, 901
[269 P.2d 249] ; DeLay v. Braun, 63 Cal.App.2d 8, 10 [146
P.2d 32]; Cambou v. Marty, 98 Cal.App.
601 [277 P.
365] .) It seems c1ear that the plaintiff was lawfully on the
defendant's
I would reverse the judgment.
Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred.

